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Non-technical Summary
After the start of EMU life has become easier for finance ministers in some
countries of the Euro area. Particularly the former high inflation countries have
experienced a marked reduction of government bond yields in comparison to the
early nineties. How will budgetary policy react to this change in the fiscal
environment? A normal reaction - a negative elasticity of public deficits to the
costs of borrowing - could counteract the objectives of the Pact for Stability and
Growth calling for balanced budgets. However, little is known about the way
governments in industrial countries react to changing borrowing conditions.
Although this issue is of importance in the debate on whether financial markets
effectively impose fiscal discipline, the empirical literature is remarkably silent.
Facing these open questions the papers offers theoretical modelling and
empirical tests. The theoretical basis is set by adapting the Hettich-Winer model.
This model explains the determination of level and structure of the government
budget from a political-economic perspective. The original set-up is extended in
order to include the decision on the optimum deficit. The basic idea of this
extension is: Political costs of deficit finance depend negatively on
sustainability. If sustainability of public debt is in danger this increases the
likelihood of debt crisis and at the same time the marginal political costs of the
deficit. The model allows to derive some testable hypotheses for the
determination of the deficit. In addition it is helpful to understand that the
decision on the deficit is part of a multidimensional optimisation.
The descriptive analysis for fiscal performance in OECD countries since 1970
allows to draw first conclusions concerning fiscal reactions to changing
borrowing costs (defined as the difference between real interest and growth
rates): There is some evidence for the existence of a normal reaction in the sense
that higher borrowing costs lead to falling primary surpluses. Nevertheless, this
reaction has been to weak to neutralise the debt service effect (rising interest
rates induce larger interest payments on the stock of outstanding debt). As a
consequence debt levels have grown for decades after the borrowing costs shock
had occurred in the seventies.
The econometric evidence based on pooled and single country regressions for
OECD countries confirms the existence of a normal reaction of deficits. In
addition, these results reveal an important asymmetry. Reactions in times of
rising borrowing costs are more pronounced than in times of falling costs. Thus,
the problem with deficits and borrowing costs is not that government
immediately jump to high deficits as soon as market conditions relax.  The
problem is that governments need too much time and react too slowly to rising
interest and falling growth rates. The good news for the medium-term fiscal
outlook in EMU countries is that even after the strong decline of real interest
rates a fast return of large deficits has not to be expected.
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11 Introduction
After the start of EMU life has become easier for finance ministers in some
countries of the Euro area. Particularly the former high inflation countries have
experienced a marked reduction of government bond yields in comparison to the
early nineties (figure 1). Also real interest rates declined substantially improving
conditions for financing high levels of public debt.
Figure 1: Long-term government bond yields
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How will budgetary policy react to this change in the fiscal environment? A normal
reaction - a negative elasticity of public deficits to the costs of borrowing - could
counteract the objectives of the Pact for Stability and Growth calling for balanced
budgets.  However, little is known about the way governments in industrial countries
react to changing borrowing conditions. Although this issue is of importance in the
debate on whether financial markets effectively impose fiscal discipline, the
empirical literature is remarkably silent. From theoretical reasoning it cannot be
taken for granted that reactions are similar to that of private actors since public
choice mechanisms complicate the reaction process.
With this background, this study is to shed light on the budgetary reactions of
industrial countries faced with changing borrowing costs. For that purpose, after a
short survey of the literature (section 2) a theoretical framework is presented based
on the positive approach to government finance by HETTICH and WINER (section 3).
This model lays the ground for the application of descriptive and econometric
analysis (sections 4 and 5). The results indicate that governments indeed react to
2changing borrowing costs although there is a significant asymmetry between rising
and falling borrowing costs.
2 Borrower Reaction: The Missing Half of Market Discipline
The literature on market discipline (BISHOP ET AL., 1989; FRENKEL AND GOLDSTEIN,
1991; LANE 1993) has identified the circumstances under that financial market
effectively restrict public borrowers’ ability to raise debt. Apart from conditions like
the absence of bailout-provisions, independence of the central bank and a stable
financial system, two further conditions are crucial: First, open markets and
sufficient information must allow for a reaction of the risk premium to an increasing
sovereign risk. Second, there must be a borrower response in the sense that the
sovereign borrower reacts smoothly to the increasing risk premium. A smooth
reaction is required in order to avoid the likelihood of a debt crisis where credit
rationing occurs cutting a public borrower suddenly off from any new credit supply.
There are numerous studies in regard to the first condition – reaction of default risk
premium - in the context of industrial countries: Within federal unions like Canada
and the U.S. there are clear differences in borrowing conditions for the states
according to their individual creditworthiness (LANE, 1993; BAYOUMI ET AL., 1995).
EICHENGREEN AND BAYOUMI (1994) and POTERBA AND RUEBEN (1999) present
evidence that restrictive fiscal rules reduce default risk premia.
For sovereign borrowing in different currencies, studies face the difficulty to
differentiate between the default risk premium component and other components of
interest rate differentials (exchange rate expectations, exchange rate risk premium).
Given this difficulty, ALESINA ET AL. (1992) take the difference between domestic
public and private bond returns as an indicator of public default risk premium and
thus find for highly indebted countries a positive though small impact of the stock of
debt on the premium. FAVERO ET AL. (1996) use cointegration analysis for the
decomposition of interest rate differentials. They find yield differentials between
Germany and European high interest countries largely determined by exchange rate
factors and low default risk premia. For Italy the result of low default risk premia
and large exchange rate related interest rate differentials is supported by
COTTARELLI AND MECAGNI (1990) and GIOVANNINI AND PIGA (1992). Furthermore,
MONGELLI (1997) cites an unpublished study by MASSON, AND SYMANSKY (1995)
for EU countries that also indicates that risk premia are small and never exceed 50
basis points even in highly indebted countries. ZIEGENHORN (1999) detects
significant risk premia which are lower for EU countries possibly due to bailout
expectations. Experience since the start of EMU has confirmed these results: After
the elimination of exchange rate risk government bond yields of EMU member
countries are trading in a very narrow range. The BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL
SETTLEMENTS (2000) reports that yield spreads within the Euro zone are typically
3contained within 40 basis points or less at any point of the yield curve. In addition, a
significant portion of these yield differentials reflect technical and liquidity factors
rather than sovereign risk.
Much less is known about the fulfilment of the second precondition for an effective
market discipline – the smooth reaction of public borrowers. While there are some
papers touching the fiscal reaction of U.S. states and cities to varying risk premia
(CAPECI, 1992; METCALF, 1993), studies for industrial countries are lacking so that
authors like FRENKEL AND GOLDSTEIN (1991) AND BAYOUMI ET AL. (1995) are
complaining about the incomplete research: “The missing half is evidence that
higher borrowing costs induce governments to correct fiscal policy excesses”
(FRENKEL AND GOLDSTEIN, 1991, p. 370) – a judgement still valid today. Also the
large number of studies that look into strategic, political-economic and institutional
determinants of government debt (for a survey see ALESINA AND PEROTTI, 1995)
largely abstracts from capital market conditions in general and variations in
borrowing conditions in particular.
Given these deficits of the literature, this study consequently concentrates on the
missing half of the market discipline hypothesis, the borrower reactions. Due to the
small extent and low variability of default risk premia for industrial countries it
seems, however, not promising to look for fiscal reactions to this variable. Instead
reactions to changes in the borrowing costs will be the focus of this study. As shown
below, public borrowing costs are most appropriately described by the differential
between real government bond yields and real growth rates since this variable is
crucial in the sustainability context. Borrowing costs defined in this way have some
advantages for the empirical analysis compared to the default risk premium: there is
considerably more cross-section and time-series variability. Apart from that,
endogeneity problems are still present but less severe, since the impact of deficits on
the interest rate-growth-differential is less important than its impact on the risk
premium.
3 The theoretical framework
In a number of papers, HETTICH and WINER (1984, 1988, 1997) have developed a
modelling approach explaining the level and structure of public revenues from a
positive perspective. Grounded on the probabilistic voting theory (MUELLER 1989,
ch. 11), politicians are assumed to set the level of the budget and to design the
revenue structure in a way that maximises voters’ support – given the budget
constraint and a set of relevant exogenous variables.
The Hettich-Winer model is also helpful to study the political-economic
determination of public deficits. In particular, the impact of changing borrowing
costs on the deficit decision can be illustrated. This framework also helps to clarify
4that the partial focus of this paper is only one aspect of an optimisation context
which has many dimensions.
Starting point of the model is a political cost function (usual properties: continuous,
twice differentiable) being minimised by the government. In the context of
probabilistic voting this can be interpreted as the negative of expected votes which
depend on the choice of policy instruments and exogenous variables.
(1)  min C (t, s, exp, x)
t, s and exp stand for tax revenues, the public primary surplus and public
expenditures net of interest payments, all three variables in relation to GDP. x is a
vector of relevant exogenous variables – among the borrowing costs as will be
explained below. The cost function is increasing in taxes and the deficit (-s), it is
decreasing in public expenditure.
The minimisation of (1) is subject to the budget constraint:
(2)  - s = exp – t
First order conditions for a cost minimum are:
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Condition (3) describes the simultaneous optimisation of both the level of the budget
and the revenue structure. Marginal political costs of tax revenues and deficit are
equalised. At the same time these marginal costs of raising revenues are equalised to
the marginal political benefit of public spending.
All derivatives are influenced by exogenous variables. Here, the focus is on the
relevant exogenous variables affecting the marginal political costs of deficits. In
principle, all variables discussed in the political-economic literature (ALESINA AND
PEROTTI, 1995) on deficit determination are part of the x vector: political stability,
degree of polarisation, characteristics of fiscal institutions etc.
Besides these variables, the sustainability situation has to be taken into account by
the optimising government. Since the government will at least be partially blamed
for a debt crisis an increasing likelihood of such a crisis will shift the marginal
political costs of deficit finance upwards: Expected marginal vote losses of a deficit
increase are larger in a situation where sustainability indicators signal the acute
threat of a debt crisis than in a situation where no such danger is realistic.
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sustainability can be used (BLANCHARD ET AL., 1990) which is the difference
between the primary surplus s*, necessary to stabilise the debt-income-ratio d, and
the actual primary surplus s. Large values of  (s*-s) indicate sustainability problems.
The evolution of the debt level is driven by the differential equation below with r the
real interest rate paid for government debt and n the real growth rate:
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the debt stabilising surplus s* is
(6) s* = d (r – n).
Stabilisation of the debt-income-ratio and thus the spirit of this indicator has the
character of a sufficient though not necessary condition for the fulfilment of the
government’s intertemporal budget constraint (see BLANCHARD ET AL., 1990 for the
relationship between this indicator and the government budget constraint). The
difference equation clarifies the crucial role of the borrowing costs measured as the
difference between the real interest rate and growth rate for sustainability. If the
growth rate exceeds the interest rate, the debt level will for any permanent primary
deficit always converge to the constant level of the debt-income-ratio s/(r-n). Only
with the interest rate exceeding the growth rate, the government is forced to generate
primary surpluses in order to respect its intertemporal budget constraint. The
surpluses have to be the higher the higher borrowing costs.
In terms of the marginal cost function (x) sC ∂∂− , s*  is part of the x vector:
Marginal political costs of deficits depend positively on s* - and thus borrowing
costs. In addition, the debt level d is part of the x vector: The inclusion of the debt
level besides the debt stabilising surplus is motivated by the fact that a rising debt
level is more serious with high than with low debt levels.
Figure 2 illustrates the comparative static of the model (this graph implies the
assumption of the  cost function being separable in s, t and exp): In the initial
equilibrium marginal political benefits of expenditures MPB’(exp) are equalised to
marginal political costs of revenues MPC’(rev) – the latter is the horizontal addition
of the curves representing the marginal political costs of the deficit (-s) and taxes (t).
In the initial equilibrium political optimisation leads to –s’, t’ and exp’.
6Now borrowing costs increase and shift s* and thus the MPC(-s) curve upwards to
MPC’’(-s). Consequently both the initial level of expenditures and the revenue
structure are left in a non-optimum situation. Expected votes can be augmented by
reducing the deficit at the cost of higher taxes and lower expenditures.
Consequently, the new equilibrium is: –s’’, t’’ and exp’’.
Figure 2: The impact of increasing borrowing costs on fiscal optimisation
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In the empirical part of the analysis, the following equation is tested:
(7) s = s( s*, d, ...)
(7) can be regarded a reduced form equation of this broader model. The theoretical
framework clearly shows: If governments react to an exogenous deterioration of
debt sustainability by reducing deficit this is only one aspect of an adjustment
comprising many dimensions.
4 Description of borrowing costs and resulting fiscal
developments
The differential equation (4) is a helpful starting point for a descriptive analysis of
changing borrowing costs’ impact on debt and deficits. A change in borrowing costs
measured as the difference between real interest rates and real growth (r-n)
influences the evolution of a debt level. With d denoting td ∂∂ / , the impact of
changing borrowing conditions on debt dynamics can be described by the
corresponding derivative of equation (4):
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The right hand side of the equation allows for a decomposition into two different
effects. The first effect (“debt service effect”) is necessarily positive (right term):
Since the outstanding debt has to be serviced an increase in borrowing costs speeds
up debt accumulation. The second effect (“primary surplus effect”) concerns the
reaction of the primary surplus to increasing borrowing costs (left term). The
“normal” reaction which would be expected in the framework of the HETTICH-
WINER model would be a lower demand for credit if it becomes more expensive.
However, even a normal reaction of the government would not safeguard a
neutralisation of the cost push. Only if the primary surplus effect would balance the
debt service effect the increase in borrowing costs would have no impact on debt
accumulation.
Thus, in the descriptive analysis it is required to pose two different questions. First,
was the primary surplus effect normal? And second, was this effect sufficient to
neutralise the debt service effect?
Variable definitions
Before looking at the data the relevant variable have to be specified. Concerning the
primary surplus, a cyclically adjusted variable is preferable since this corresponds
best to the underlying long-run concept of sustainability. Therefore, the cyclically
adjusted primary surplus as calculated by the OECD (source: OECD economic
outlook, Fiscal Positions and Business Cycles database) is used.
In order to quantify borrowing costs, a definition of real growth and interest rates is
necessary. The growth rate is calculated on the basis of real potential output (source:
OECD) since potential growth corresponds best to the concept of long-run
sustainability. Real interest rates are defined on an ex post base as the difference
between long term government bond yields (source: IMF International Financial
Statistics) and inflation where inflation is based on the government consumption
deflator (source: OECD).
Concerning the choice of the interest rate it has to be stressed that changes in market
yields only affect interest payments after outstanding long-term bonds mature and
are refinanced at new market conditions. Thus the effectively paid interest rates are
determined by a moving average of past market rates which is depicted for the US
example in figure 3. Here government bond yields are contrasted by the effective
interest rate which is calculated as the ratio of government interest payments and
8outstanding public debt. The effective rate shows typical moving average properties
with much lower fluctuations than the market rate.
Figure 3: Long term government bond yields and effective public debt
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Some descriptive statistics
Figure 4 plots the average (19 OECD countries1, unweighted average) of borrowing
costs together with its driving forces real interest and growth rate defined as
described. The following facts emerge: Borrowing costs are largely driven by real
interest rates which show much more variation than potential growth. Furthermore,
there is a strong rise in borrowing costs between 1974 and 1983 ending the times of
negative borrowing costs that had guaranteed long-run sustainability even with
permanent high primary deficits. After that borrowing costs have remained quite
stable in the positive range and have only in recent years been driven down –
partially caused by falling real interest rates in former European high inflation
countries in the context of EMU.
                                          
1 The countries included are: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France,
Germany, Ireland, Japan, New Zealand, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, UK
and USA.
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Figure 5 summarises the dynamics along equation (8) for the OECD average,
depicting borrowing costs, the primary surplus (cyclically adjusted) and the annual
change in the debt-GDP-ratio. It can be seen that the deficits were not only slow to
react to the strong increase in borrowing costs, in the first years of the cost push
primary deficits even climbed further. It took almost ten years after the rising
borrowing costs were followed by shrinking deficits. As a consequence of this slow
reaction the speed of debt accumulation measured by the increasing debt-GDP-ratio
increased. Only since the mid-nineties primary balances have clearly turned positive
thus allowing for a slowdown of debt accumulation. Of course, this descriptive
analysis based on OECD average does only give a first hint while it conceals
substantial differences between countries. In the appendix there are country plots
describing the adjustment profiles on a country specific basis.
Figure 5: Borrowing costs, primary surplus and debt changes – average
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Figure 6 shows average cross correlations between the primary surplus and lagged
borrowing costs. This indicates normal reactions in the sense that increasing
borrowing costs are on average followed by increasing surpluses where the
correlation reaches a maximum at lag 4. More formal testing, however, does not
allow this correlation to be interpreted in a causal way. Table 1 summarises results
of Granger causality tests. Only in 3 out of 15 countries for which data availability
allows for an analysis, the test indicates that borrowing costs Granger- cause the
surplus.
Figure 6: Average cross correlations between surplus and lagged borrowing
costs (unweighted means of cross correlations in 19 OECD
countries)
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Table 1: Granger causality test of hypothesis: borrowing costs do not
Granger cause surplus
Hypothesis rejected
(*/**/***: 10/5/1% level
of significance)
hypothesis not rejected test not possible due to
limited number of
observations
Austria*
Canada***
Ireland**
Australia, Belgium, Germany,
Spain, Finland, France, Italy,
Japan, Netherlands, Norway,
Portugal, USA
Denmark, United
Kingdom, Sweden, New
Zealand
Due to limited number of observations the test was based on a lag length of six periods although
information criteria recommended to include a larger number of lags.
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The descriptive analysis allows some first conclusions for OECD countries as a
whole: First, there is some weak evidence on the existence of a normal primary
surplus effect. Second, in the eighties and the first half of the nineties this effect was
to weak to balance the debt service effect. As a consequence it took about twenty
years before the debt accumulation caused by strongly rising borrowing costs could
be stopped.
5 Econometric analysis
The reduced form equation (7) of the adapted HETTICH WINER is the starting point
for the econometric analysis. The surplus should react to borrowing costs (equal to
the difference between interest rate and growth rate), the debt level and further
exogenous variables with an impact on the political costs of deficits.
As motivated in the descriptive part above the (dependent) surplus variable is the
cyclically adjusted primary surplus (in relation to trend GDP). Besides borrowing
costs (difference between real interest and real growth rate) and the debt-GDP-level
(lagged by one period due to obvious endogeneity) two further independent
variables are included:
EOC (election or cabinet reshuffle) is a variable counting general elections and
significant changes in the government which can also be a cabinet reshuffle. The
source is KEESING’S RECORD OF WORLD EVENTS. The EOC variable is an indicator
for political instability being a standard explanation for high deficits. It should
therefore have a negative impact on the surplus.
The Maastricht dummy is 1 for EU countries from 1991 onwards and 0 else. This
dummy is to measure the impact of the Maastricht treaty which was negotiated in
1991 (in a broad sense: EMU convergence criteria and later on the disciplining
pressure of the Pact for Stability and Growth) on fiscal performance of EU countries
in the nineties.
As usual the estimations have to take account for the possibility of unit roots in the
time series which can not be excluded a priori for the following variables: surplus,
debt-GDP-ratio, real interest and growth rates and the resulting borrowing costs. For
all these series standard ADF unit root testing along the procedure described in
ENDERS (1995, 257) was applied with the following results (5 per cent significance
level): For most countries, the null of at least one unit root could be rejected for real
interest rates, real growth rates and borrowing costs. Thus, these series can be
regarded as stationary, whereas the existence of one unit root could for no country
be rejected in the case of the debt ratio. The surplus variable showed mixed results
for different countries. Therefore, generally first differences of the debt and surplus
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ratio are used. Only in the single country estimation of Austria levels of the surplus
variable are used since for this country the unit root hypothesis could be rejected.
The regression results might be influenced by simultaneity problems, since the
surplus could have an impact on interest rates and thus borrowing costs (first half of
the market discipline hypothesis). However, if this is relevant, this would imply a
negative correlation between interest rates and the disturbance in the equation
explaining the surplus: a higher surplus would be expected to lead to lower interest
rates. As a result, an OLS estimate of the interest rate coefficient is biased
downwards. Thus, the finding of a significant impact of interest rates on the surplus
in the presence of such a simultaneity cannot be the consequence of a simultaneity
bias. If present, this bias would indicate an impact smaller than the true one.
5.1 Panel estimation
Table 2 presents the results of a fixed effects panel estimation for 17 countries (the
countries of footnote 1 less Portugal and Spain that had to be excluded due to
missing data). Three specifications are estimated in order to test for two different
kinds of asymmetries.
First, the column 1 specification allows to detect a possible asymmetry between the
impact of interest rates and growth rates. These two variables determine borrowing
costs. According to the theoretical considerations above it should make no
difference whether a change in borrowing costs is caused by changing growth rates
or interests rates. The empirical validity of this model implication can be tested by
the appropriate Wald test on the equality of (absolute) values of both coefficients.
Second, the column 3 specification explores a possible asymmetry between
increasing and decreasing borrowing costs. For this purpose, the borrowing costs
variable is replaced by two variables – one variable representing borrowing costs if
these costs have increased in comparison to the previous period and one variable for
the opposite case. Again, a Wald test is applied in order to test whether this
differentiated specification is more appropriate.
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Table 2: Fixed Effects Pooled Cross Section Time Series: First Difference of
Primary Surplus (1972 – 1998, 17 countries, 302 unbalanced
observations)
1. 2. 3.
a. real interest rate 3.89 (0.06)*
b. real growth rate -4.49 (0.57)
c. borrowing costs 3.94 (0.04)**
d. borrowing costs if
    ∆ borrowing costs > 0
9.17(0.00)**
*
e. borrowing costs if
    ∆ borrowing costs < 0
-0.46(0.85)
g. L(1-L) debt ratio 4.17 (0.07)* 4.18 (0.07)* 3.56(0.10)*
h. EOC -0.14 (0.23) -0.15 (0.22) -0.14(0.24)
h. Maastricht dummy 0.35 (0.08)* 0.35 (0.08)* 0.34(0.09)*
Wald test on restriction a=-b (0.94) d=e(0.01)***
Joint F-Test 6.14 (0.00) 8.22 (0.00) 8.26 (0.00)
Durbin-Watson 1.84 1.84 1.80
  p-values in parenthesis (Significance Level ***/**/* = 1/5/10%), L denotes the lag-operator
The first column shows that there is no indication of a first type asymmetry. The
equality of magnitude hypothesis for coefficients a and b (with opposite sign) can
not be rejected. The lacking significance of the real growth rate variable alone
should not come as a surprise given its low time series variance. Time series
variance is crucial in a fixed effect estimation to produce significant results.
The third column specification, however, clearly indicates the second type
asymmetry. The highly significant difference between coefficients d and e and the
insignificance of e show that the reaction of surpluses is restricted to times of rising
borrowing costs. As a whole, the results of the panel estimation clearly back the
theoretical considerations. Borrowing costs and the debt ratio have a positive and
significant impact on the surplus. In addition, both the EOC variable and the
Maastricht variable have the correct sign. However, of these two variables only the
Maastricht dummy is significant.
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1.2 Times series analyses for selected countries
Since the pooled estimation might conceal different fiscal behaviour in OECD
countries it is worthwhile to add separate estimations for individual countries. Full
data availability (1970-1998) allows to include Austria, Canada, Germany, Italy, and
Japan into this analytical step (tables 3 to 7) . Estimation specifications follow the
same approach as in the preceding pooled analysis.
The following tests were applied in order to check for misspecifications: the
Ramsey-Reset misspecification test (null: no misspecification), the LM-White test
on heteroscedasticity (null: homoscedasticity) and the LM test on autocorrelation
(null: no autocorrelation). The Reset test uses 2 fitted terms, the LM-White test
contains only second order polynomials without cross terms due to limited degrees
of freedom, and the autocorrelation test is performed up to 2 lags. In case of
heteroskedasticity a White heteroskedasticity consistent covariance matrix estimator
is used. In case of autocorrelation lagged endogeneous variables are added (this
concerns only Japan).
Table 3: Austria Surplus in Level
1. 2. 3.
a. real interest rate 24.81 (0.00)***
b. real growth rate -14.94 (0.20)
c. borrowing costs 22.91(0.00)***
d. borrowing costs if
    ∆ borrowing costs > 0
29.73 (0.02)**
e. borrowing costs if
    ∆ borrowing costs < 0
1.59 (0.93)
f. L(1-L) debt ratio -30.17 (0.00)*** -25.97(0.00)*** 4.56 (0.62)
g. EOC -0.06 (0.08)* -0.51 (0.10)* -0.92 (0.04)**
h. Maastricht dummy 0.43 (0.26) 0.56 (0.10)* 0.28 (0.57)
Wald test on restrictions a=-b (0.48) d=f  (0.21)
adjusted R2 0.46 0.47 0.25
reset test (0.90) (0.73) (0.26)
LM autocorrelation test (0.36) (0.32) (0.39)
LM White test heterosced. (0.93) (0.99) (0.35)
tables 3-7: p-values in parenthesis (Significance Level ***/**/* = 1/5/10%)
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Table 4: Difference of Canada’s Surplus
1. 2. 3.
a. L real interest rate 17.15 (0.03)**
b. L real growth rate -9.69 (0.29)
c. L borrowing costs 14.52(0.03)**
d. borrowing costs if
    ∆ borrowing costs > 0
9.87 (0.34)
e. borrowing costs if
    ∆ borrowing costs < 0
0.19 (0.98)
f. L(1-L) debt ratio -7.61 (0.46)*** -4.10 (0.65) 3.74 (0.74)
g. EOC -0.04 (0.93) -0.16 (0.66) 0.12 (0.76)
Wald test on restrictions a=-b (0.46) d=e  (0.39)
adjusted R2 0.17 0.18 -0.016
reset test (0.79) (0.64) (0.16)
LM autocorrelation test (0.95) (0.93) (0.70)
LM White test heterosced. (0.67) (0.50) (0.17)
Table 5: Difference of Germany’s Surplus
1. 2. 3.
a. L real interest rate 7.84 (0.20)
b. L real growth rate -5.32 (0.60)
c. L borrowing costs 9.98 (0.18)
d. borrowing costs if
    ∆ borrowing costs > 0
9.96 (0.26)
e. borrowing costs if
    ∆ borrowing costs < 0
-10.54(0.09)*
f. L(1-L) debt ratio 17.03 (0.08)* -16.35 (0.08)* 16.64 (0.19)
g. EOC -0.18 (0.66) -0.13 (0.74) -0.15 (0.74)
h. Maastricht dummy -0.17 (0.77) -0.08 (0.88) -0.25 (0.40)
Wald test on restrictions a=-b (0.74) d=e  (0.07)*
adjusted R2 0.08 0.12 0.08
reset test (0.16) (0.15) (0.14)
LM autocorrelation test (0.70) (0.64) (0.70)
LM White test heterosced. (0.11) (0.12) (0.13)
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Table 6: Difference of Italy‘s Surplus
1. 2. 3.
a. L real interest rate 2.88 (0.67)
b. L real growth rate -11.91 (0.62)
c. L borrowing costs 4.31 (0.46)
d. borrowing costs if
    ∆ borrowing costs > 0
26.40(0.00)***
e. borrowing costs if
    ∆ borrowing costs < 0
-7.02 (0.19)**
f. L(1-L) debt ratio 1.86 (0.88) -0.44 (0.96) -12.61 (0.20)
g. EOC 0.40 (0.34) 0.33 (0.37) 0.39 (0.19)
h. Maastricht dummy 1.06 (0.18) 0.97(0.22) 0.77(0.26)
Wald test on restrictions a=-b (0.74) d=e  (0.00)***
adjusted R2 0.06 0.09 0.28
reset test (0.38) (0.25) (0.89)
LM autocorrelation test (0.34) (0.28) (0.12)
LM White test heterosced. (0.15) (0.21) (0.18)
Table 7: Difference of Japan’s Surplus
1. 2. 3.
    L(1-L) surplus 0.31 (0.10)* 0.35 (0.09)* 0.48 (0.00)***
a. L real interest rate 6.49 (0.10)*
b. L real growth rate 0.31 (0.98)
c. L borrowing costs 5.15 (0.09)
d. borrowing costs if
    ∆ borrowing costs > 0
27.64
(0.00)***
e. borrowing costs if
    ∆ borrowing costs < 0
-3.37 (0.00)***
f. L(1-L) debt ratio 4.91 (0.54) 7.58 (0.25) 5.78 (0.29)
g. EOC -0.13 (0.68) -0.03 (0.92) -0.13 (0.54)
Wald test on restrictions a=-b (0.57) d=e  (0.00)***
adjusted R2 0.12 0.15 0.36
reset test (0.66) (0.86) (0.65)
LM autocorrelation test (0.78) (0.93) (0.88)
LM White test heterosced. (0.13) (0.29) (0.54)
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In Austria and Canada borrowing costs have a positive and significant impact on the
surplus and asymmetries are not significant. Germany, Italy and Japan all show
significant asymmetries: The deficit reactions to the level of borrowing costs depend
on whether borrowing cost increase or decrease. As in the panel estimation, times of
increasing borrowing costs correspond to the model: the surplus is positively
affected by borrowing costs. With decreasing borrowing costs, however, no
significant deficit increases can be detected. On the contrary, for these three
countries the sign of the coefficient e is even negative – implying higher surpluses in
times of low borrowing costs.
The debt level variable does not perform in line with theoretical predictions in these
single country regressions. Apart from the specification 1 for Germany it is always
either insignificant or has the wrong sign. Also the EOC and Maastricht variables
perform worse than in the panel  – they are largely insignificant and/or show
counter-theoretical signs. One possible explanation for the poor performance of
these variables in comparison to the panel is that in the separate estimations no cross
section information can be exploited.
Nevertheless, like the panel also these country regressions show one robust result:
With one exception (Germany) there is always a positive impact of borrowing costs
on the surplus – at least in times of increasing borrowing costs.
6 Conclusion
What do the results tell in regard to the “missing half” of evidence on the market
discipline hypothesis? One clear answer is: Governments in industrial countries
react to borrowing costs in a significant way. Even if it is not easy for a government
to push up the primary surplus this seems nevertheless to be in line with political
optimisation in a situation of increasing borrowing costs.
However, in spite of this result there is no reason to expect market discipline to
prevent governments from piling up large debt mountains.  The primary surplus
reactions are too slow and to small for a compensation of the debt service effect.
This has clearly been demonstrated by the descriptive analysis of fiscal policy of the
eighties and the first half of the nineties.
The fundamental asymmetry between times of increasing and decreasing borrowing
cost deserves attention. In the EMU context this is comforting where a number of
countries have experienced a strong reduction of borrowing costs. According to the
econometric evidence above (both the panel and the single country regression for
Italy) this development is no reason to expect a fast increase of primary deficits.
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Thus, the problem with deficits and borrowing cost is not that governments always
immediately jump to high deficits as soon as borrowing conditions relax. The
increasing debt levels between 1970 and 1995 have rather been caused by the fact
that governments need too much time and react too slowly to rising interest and
falling growth rates.
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Appendix II: Borrowing costs (BC, left axis), Change of debt-GDP-ratio (DD,
right axis) and adjusted primary surplus (S, right axis) for 19
OECD countries
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